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 Globalization Theories: From the Scalar to the Relational 
 
As the 20th century entered its closing decade, the concept of globalization 
became ever more seen and heard as “a key idea by which we understand the 
transition of human society into the third millennium” (Waters, 1995: 1), but 
with ever-decreasing precision of meaning (Sinclair, 2004: 65).  
 
The 1990s witnessed a boom in globalization theory, and even if much of that work 
has been subject to critique in more recent years, globalization theory continues to 
play a central role in global media studies. This is most apparent in the pervasive 
assumption that the world’s media are now dominated by a relatively small number of 
transnational corporations (TNCs). Herman and McChesney (1997) argued that ‘The 
… global media system is dominated by three or four dozen large transnational 
corporations with fewer than ten mostly U.S.-based media conglomerates towering 
over the global market’ (Herman and McChesney, 1997: 1). Steger (2003) observed 
that ‘To a very large extent, the global cultural flows of our time are generated and 
directed by global media empires that rely on powerful communication technologies 
to spread their message … During the last two decades, a small group of very large 
TNCs have come to dominate the global market for entertainment, news, television, 
and film’ (Steger, 2003: 76). In a review of media and cultural globalization literature, 
Held et. al. concluded that ‘there can be little doubt that … a group of around 20-30 
very large MNCs dominate global markets for entertainment, news, television, etc., 
and they have acquired a very significant cultural and economic presence on nearly 
every continent’ (Held et. al., 1999, p. 347).1 Recently, Sussman (2007) has argued 
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that ‘Worldwide … the mass media are controlled by between 70 and 80 first- and 
second-tier corporations’ (Sussman, 2007: 360).  
 
Other core propositions in global media studies have followed from the assumption 
that control over media markets has come to be increasingly dominated by a small 
number of globally integrated TNCs. In particular, this global concentration of media 
ownership and control links with arguments associated with the strong globalization 
proposition that the period since the 1980s has seen a qualitative shift in the pattern of 
economic, social, political and cultural relations within and between states and 
societies, as distinct from a quantitative change, or extensions and intensifications of 
more longstanding trends. Giddens (1997) argued that we were witnessing the 
globalization of modernity, which ‘is changing everyday life, particularly in the 
developed countries, at the same time as it is creating new transnational systems and 
forces … taken as a whole, globalization is transforming the institutions of the 
societies in which we live’ (Giddens, 1997: 33). Held et. al. presented a 
transformationalist account of globalization, where ‘at the dawn of a new millennium, 
globalization as a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic 
changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order’ (Held et. al., 1999: 7). 
Hardt and Negri (2000) argued that ‘Over the past several decades … we have 
witnessed an irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural 
exchanges … [and] declining sovereignty of nation-states and their inability to 
regulated economic and cultural exchanges’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xi-xii). Herman 
and McChesney concluded that ‘Few eras in history have approached this one for 
tumult and rapidity of change, and key hallmarks of the era have been the spread of an 
increasingly unfettered global capitalism, a global media and communications system, 
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and the development of revolutionary communications technologies (Herman and 
McChesney, 1997: 205). Castells (1996) identified global electronic communications 
as generating a culture of real virtuality, where ‘the new communication system 
radically transforms space and time … [and] localities become disembodied from 
their cultural, historical, geographic meaning, and reintegrated into functional 
networks … inducing a space of flows that substitutes for the space of places’ 
(Castells, 1996: 375). For Castells, ‘the space of flows of the Information Age 
dominates the space of places of people’s cultures’, with the result being that ‘the 
network society disembodies social relationships … because it is made up of 
networks of production, power, and experience, which construct a culture of virtuality 
in the global flows that transcend time and space’ (Castells, 2000: 369-370). 
Underpinning many of these analyses is the view that there been a scalar shift in 
social relations arising from globalization that is of such a scale that the analytical 
tools by which we understand social processes in the 21st century are fundamentally 
different to those which were applicable to 20th century societies. 
 
John Sinclair’s observation on globalization theories – that their meaning has become 
less clear as the use of the concept has become more pervasive – captures two 
important points about how the concept has developed from the early 1990s to the 
present. The first is that the term certainly experienced a boom throughout the 1990s, 
and that it became, as Tomlinson has argued, ‘the buzz-word of the 1990s, just as 
postmodernism was the intellectual vogue of the 1980s’ (Tomlinson, 2003: 10). 
Indeed, one can trace an arc in academic publications on globalization that is 
bracketed at one end by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of Soviet and East 
European communist states in 1989-90, and at the other by the September 11, 2001 
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attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States. The latter 
threw into question some core assumptions of globalization theory, such as the 
assumption that Western powers (and the U.S. in particular) had achieved decisive 
military, political and cultural hegemony over the world and that a homogeneous 
global culture was emerging, but even in the case of September 11 and the subsequent 
‘War on Terror’, the assumption that the clash of cultures and ideologies has become 
essentially global in its nature can still be put forward (e.g. Barber, 2003; Hardt and 
Negri, 2004).  
 
The second point is that, in contrast to postmodernism, globalization theories have 
tended to travel light on questions of ontology and epistemology, preferring instead to 
couch claims about an epistemic shift in ‘an empirical reality ... focused in certain 
emblematic events’ (Tomlinson, 2003: 11). Indeed, many of these accounts present 
globalization as the unfolding of an immanent logic, whether of capitalism as a world-
system (e.g. Herman and McChesney), modernity as a socio-cultural process (e.g. 
Giddens), or both (e.g. Castells). Held and McGrew defined globalization in terms of 
such a build-up of long-standing tendencies of capitalist modernity to the point where 
they come to constitute a scalar shift: 
 
Globalization … denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up 
and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social 
interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human 
organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power 
relations across the world’s regions and continents (Held and McGrew, 2002: 
1).  
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The difficulty is that the evidence presented for such scalar shifts has always existed 
alongside counter-evidence, so that the salience of globalization as an overarching 
descriptor could vary depending upon the angle from which one chose to look. A 
range of markers of globalization can be used, that range from economics and finance 
to culture and communication, to geo-politics and law, and different observations can 
ne made about its extent and significance depending upon the starting point that is 
chosen by the analyst (Flew, 2007).  
 
One response to such conflicting trends and the difficulty of establishing solid 
empirical foundations to the claims of globalization theory could be to reject the 
paradigm outright. Sparks (2007) takes such a position, arguing that ‘theories of 
globalization … are so far from providing an accurate picture of the contemporary 
world that they are virtually useless’ (Sparks, 2007: 152), and that any useful insights 
they have identified are better explained as aspects of capitalist development in its 
imperialist phase. Another response would be to see the term as essentially 
ideological, as Harvey (2005) does in his invocation of globalization, neo-liberalism 
and postmodernism as something of an unholy trinity enabling a new assertion of 
capitalist class power on a transnational scale, subverting locally and nationally-based 
oppositional trade union and social movements and social-democratic politics more 
generally. More generally, one could respond empirically by pointing out how the 
2000s differed from the 1990s. The collapse of the Doha Round of trade talks 
brokered through the WTO in many ways symbolized this change in times. As a 
breakdown in negotiations between the United States in one camp and India and 
China in the other derailed the Doha round in July 2008, maybe it was time to say that 
the emperors of supranational and para-statal governance had no clothes after all, and 
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we remained locked into a system of states that has existed in one form or another 
since the Treaty of Westphalia  of the 17th century, as globalization skeptics such as 
Hirst and Thompson (1996) argued? 
 
The approach taken in this paper retains globalization as a relevant concept for 
understanding contemporary socio-economic trends and their relevance to global 
media studies, but rejects strong globalization theories as lacking an adequate 
historically and empirically grounding. The problem with globalization theories has 
been a conceptual one deriving, perhaps paradoxically, from insufficient attention 
being given to the spatial dimensions of such changes, leading to the focus upon 
globalization as marking a scalar shift in socio-spatial relations that is without 
historical precedent. I am defining a scalar shift as one where the dominant mode of 
socio-spatial relations shifts from one level to another. One example from sociology is 
the idea that the dominant modes of social interaction and power relations have been 
shifting over time from localities and communities to territorially defined nation-
states, and now from nation-states to the interconnected globe. This three-part 
structure maps onto a reading of socio-cultural relations that identifies the pre-modern 
or traditional, the modern, and the postmodern, so that there is reference to an era of 
postmodern globalization (e.g. Kellner and Best, 1997). Connecting this to media 
studies and media history, there is a common tradition of associating print culture 
with modernity and television with globalization and postmodernity (e.g. Barker, 
1997), with the result being that such work in media and cultural studies sits 
comparatively easily with theories of globalization defined in terms of a scalar shift 
beyond the territorially defined nation-states.  
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The assumptions about a scalar shift from the national to the global, and the 
accompanying lack of attention to spatial complexity, draws attention to the need to 
more explicitly foreground the contribution of geographical perspectives to an 
understanding of a phenomenon as explicitly spatial in its dimensions as 
globalization. Ash Amin has defined the geographical perspective on globalization in 
these terms: 
 
Geographical theory … has been concerned with the spatiality of the 
contemporary world, and is interested in understanding whether places – cities, 
regions, and nations – are perforating as geographically contained spaces, how 
the insertion of places into geographically stretched relations matters, and how 
new geographical scales of organization and influence associated with 
globalization are challenging old scales of identification and action (Amin, 
2001: 6271).  
 
Such an approach recognizes that scalar relations can change, but that such changes 
would mark shifts in processes that have long been multi-scalar in their nature, 
ranging across the local, the regional, the national, the international and the global. 2 
This geographical perspective draws attention to the ways in which relations between 
these scales of social activity are transformed in ways that are interconnected and 
mutually constituitive, and what is referred to as the ‘spatial ontology of social 
organization’ (Amin, 2002: 386). Most particularly, it focuses attention on the 
relational dimensions of socio-spatial change, moving away from conception of 
globalization in terms of a ‘runaway world’ (Giddens, 2002) or ‘global flows that 
transcend time and space’ (Castells, 2000: 370), towards a focus upon the ways in 
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which geographical locations can become ‘clusters of overlapping network sites’ 
(Amin, 2001: 6275), where there is an interlocking of activities across multiple planes 
of the global, the national, the regional and the local. Such a methodological starting-
point draws attention to the need to develop different research agendas for global 
media studies to those premised upon metaphors of a fundamental scalar shift, or ‘an 
irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges’ (Hardt 
and Negri, 2000: xi).  
 
A Critique of Globalization as Scalar Shift 
 
At the core of many of the strong globalization arguments are a set of interlocking 
economic, political, technological and cultural claims. It is argued that we now live in 
a truly global economy, integrated by networked information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), that have one the one hand weakened the political-economic 
power of the nation-state, and on the other generated a global media culture built upon 
shared symbolic experiences and the transformation of time-space relationships. 
Whether this is to be welcomed as the harbinger of a globally integrated economy and 
emergent global civil society (e.g. Legrain, 2002; Friedman, 2005), or opposed for its 
denial of the specificities of place, culture, national identity and territorial sovereignty 
(e.g. Barber, 2000), it is largely taken to be an empirically given fact of 21st century 
societies. It may be that the global financial crisis of 2008 will be taken as marking 
out a limit-point to what has been referred to as neo-liberal globalization (McGuigan, 
2005), but the evidence at this stage is not yet clear on this.  
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Global media are central to this perceived scalar shift in contemporary capitalist 
societies as the principal developers of the new global information and 
communication technologies and infrastructure, as large multinational corporations 
that are transforming national mediascapes, and as the principal bearers of 
information and images through which we make sense of events in distant places and 
generate shared systems of meaning and understanding across nations, regions and 
cultures. Giddens emphasized the extent to which ‘Globalization … has been 
influenced above all by development in systems of communication, dating back only 
to the late 1960s’ (Giddens, 2002: 10 – emphasis added), while Castells argued that 
‘under the informational paradigm, a new culture has emerged from the superceding 
of places and the annihilation of time by the pace of flows and by … the culture of 
real virtuality (Castells, 2000: 370 – author’s emphasis).  
 
I will argue that behind these assumptions are a set of interlocking claims about the 
dimensions of globalization as a fundamental scalar shift that do not stand up well to 
close empirical scrutiny. In doing so, the relevance of a relational frame derived from 
geographical perspectives will be observed.  
 
1. Markets increasingly operate on a global scale, and are dominated by a 
diminishing number of transnational corporations (TNCs). 
 
One indicator for the reach and significance of TNCs is the Transnationality Index 
(TNI) developed by the United Nations Commission for Trade, Aid and Development 
(UNCTAD). The TNI which measures the transnationality of the world’s top 100 
non-financial corporations on the basis of the percentage of assets, sales and 
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employees outside of the corporation’s national home base.3 Using the TNI, Dicken 
(2003a) found that the degree of transnationality of these top 100 non-financial TNCs 
increased from 51.6 per cent in 1993 to 52.6 per cent in 1999, which would not 
indicate a significant shift in the scale of global operations of these largest 
corporations, who would be expected to be at the forefront of globalization. On 
average, most of the world’s largest non-financial TNCs continue to undertake 40-50 
per cent of their activities in their ‘home’ country, and those with the largest 
proportion of activities outside of their home country tend either to be from countries 
with smaller home markets (e.g. TNCs from Switzerland, Canada, Australia or 
Sweden, rather than the United States or Japan), or to be in resource-related industries 
such as mining or petrochemicals, where the primary resource assets are globally 
dispersed. Importantly, media and entertainment industries are among the least 
globalized, with only Thomson Corporation (Canada) being among the top 100 non-
financial TNCs from the media sector in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2007). Insofar as 
communications corporations are developing their global capacities, this is a much 
stronger tendency in telecommunications than in media, which is consistent with Glyn 
and Sutcliffe’s (1999) observation that service industries tend, as a general rule, to be 
less globalized than those in manufacturing, mining and infrastructure provision.  
 
2. These TNCs organize their activities on a global scale, and are less and less 
constrained by the policies and regulations of nation-states. 
 
If we understand a global corporation to be ‘a firm that has the power to co-ordinate 
and control operations in a large number of countries … [and] whose geographically-
dispersed operations are functionally integrated’, as distinct from ‘national 
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corporations with international operations (i.e. foreign subsidiaries)’ (Dicken, 2003a: 
225), then there is an extensive literature from fields such as business management, 
economic geography and economic sociology that indicates that the truly global 
corporation remain something of a myth, outward appearances to the contrary. 
Doremus et. al. (1998) did not find evidence of convergence in the institutional and 
policy environments that faced businesses as a result of globalization, and that the 
world's leading multinationals continue to be shaped decisively by the policies and 
values of their home countries, and that their core operations are not converging to 
create a seamless global market. Gertler has observed that ‘the enduring path-
dependent institutions of the nation-state retain far greater influence over the 
decisions and practices of corporate actor than the prevailing wisdom would allow’ 
(Gertler, 2003: 12), while Dicken has argued that ‘TNCs … remain, to a very high 
degree, products of the local “ecosystem” in which they were originally planted. 
TNCs are not placeless; “global” corporations are, indeed, a myth’ (Dicken 2003a: 
44).  
 
3. The power of nation-states is in decline, with many of their core operations 
being superceded by the laws and regulations established by supra-national 
governmental institutions. 
 
Claims about the ‘declining sovereignty of nation-states and their increasing inability 
to regulate economic and cultural exchanges’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii) are not 
supported by empirical evidence. Weiss (1999) has argued that of seven possible 
indicators that economic globalization has transcended the significance of national 
economies, there is only one case – finance – where genuinely global markets have 
 15 
emerged. In other major indicators – such as production for domestic markets as 
compared to exports, financing of domestic investment by domestic savings rather 
than foreign direct investment, the degree of integration of equity markets worldwide, 
the orientation of corporate decision-making in ‘home’ markets, and trade patterns 
being primarily regional rather than global – there was little substantive shift between 
the 1970s and the 1990s.  
 
Moreover, comparative trends in levels of taxation, welfare expenditure or industrial 
policy do not reveal a trend towards convergence; rather diverse institutional forms of 
national capitalisms retain significance, with the Anglo-Saxon liberal market 
economies, continental European coordinated market economies, and East Asian 
coordinated market economies remaining distinctive ideal-types, joined now by 
models as diverse as those of China, Russia, India and the Middle East (Weiss, 2003; 
Perraton and Clift, 2004). In the economic realm, the ‘decline of the nation-state’ 
literature has conflated the reduced capacity to pursue certain types of 
macroeconomic policy (e.g. deficit financing of government spending, capital and 
exchange rate controls) with a decline in the capacity of nation-states to manage the 
economy overall and to pursue national economic policy objectives in the context of a 
more integrated global economy. Work on comparative media policy such as that of 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) indicates limitations to the convergence thesis as applied 
to North American and European media systems, and there is considerably less 
evidence of media policy convergence in the Asian region (Thomas, 2006).  
 
4. Globalization generates increasingly global media cultures.  
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The global media cultures thesis has two variants. The first, which goes back to 
UNESCO-supported research in the 1970s and 1980s (Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974; 
Varis, 1984), drew upon evidence of U.S. domination of audiovisual trade to conclude 
that a one-way flow of media content formed the basis of cultural imperialism. The 
problems with this work were firstly the fact that the vast bulk of media content is not 
internationally traded, and secondly that empirical evidence from a range of nation 
and regions suggested that television systems tended to become more nationally-
based over time (Tracey, 1988; Sepstrup, 1989). As Barker observed of these 
analyses, ‘a restricted range of studies has been used to generalize in an unsustainable 
manner and draw universal conclusions which then form the basis of global cultural 
theories’ (Barker, 1997: 49). Tunstall (2007) has reinforced these findings with his 
claim that the global significance of U.S. media is actually in decline, that most large 
nation-states are broadly (80-90 per cent) media self-sufficient, and that while ‘a 
global or world level of media certainly does exist … [it] plays a much smaller role 
than national media’ (Tunstall, 2007: xiv).  
 
More recent globalization theories have tended to link global media cultures to 
transnational media communications technologies (cable, satellite, Internet) and 
media events, to argue for what Giddens referred to disembedding or ‘the “lifting out” 
of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across 
indefinite spans of time-space’ as a feature of global modernity (Giddens, 1990: 21). 
These arguments rest upon assumptions about media and culture that are difficult to 
sustain empirically, and rest upon a conflation of culture and technology. The first is 
that culture is taken as synonymous with the media, and particularly with electronic 
media of mass communications. This not only downplays the ongoing significance of 
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culture as lived and shared experience as distinct from mediated symbolic 
communication, but also ignores those cultural forms whose circulation is primarily 
local rather than global – the focus is almost exclusively on cinema and television, not 
the arts, music, live performance, literature, newspapers or radio (Flew, 2007). 
Second, media are understood in terms of their distribution technologies rather than 
their content, in a manner that is strongly framed by the speculative media theorists 
such as Marshall McLuhan (1964) and Jean Baudrillard (1990).4 Again, the 
assumption that media content becomes more global as global distribution 
technologies are developed is frankly contradicted by the comparative history of 
national television systems which indicate that ‘passing through an initial stage of 
foreign dependence to a maturity of the national market is, if not universal, then 
certainly a common pattern’ (Sinclair, 2004: 76). There is considerable evidence in 
the development of national television systems of an intersection between audience 
preferences for programming from their own country and in their own vernacular, 
development of local programming production capacity, and state policies to foster 
local television production and the use of television to promote a shared national 
cultural identity (Straubhaar, 1997; Sinclair, 2004). While such work needs updating 
in the context of Internet downloading sites such as You Tube to confirm whether 
national preference continues to exist in an age where new distribution technologies 
allow for a la carte television, it would be surprising if new technologies had 
eliminated national cultural preference, as it has never simply been a by-product of 
the technological affordances of the time.  
 
5. Global media are central to the separation of place and space, which is a 
defining feature of globalization. 
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One trend that is generally associated with globalization is a blurring of the lines 
between different spatial scales. Giddens (1990) described this as the blurring of the 
distinction between place and space, so that the intensification of global 
interconnectedness means the distinction between what is tangible and ‘local’ and 
what is external or ‘global’ is no longer tenable. Jessop (2000) has referred to the 
‘relativisation of scale’ arising from the simultaneous occurrence of time-space 
distanciation, which ‘involves the stretching of social relations over time and space so 
that relations can be controlled or coordinated over longer periods of time (including 
into the ever more distant future) and over longer distances, greater areas or more 
scales of activity’, and time-space compression, involving ‘the intensification of 
“discrete” events in real time and/or the increased velocity of material and immaterial 
flows over a given distance … linked to changing material and social technologies 
enabling more precise control over ever shorter periods of action’ (Jessop, 2000: 340). 
 
The relativisation of scale is certainly a core concept associated with globalization in 
all of its dimensions. The danger is that the association of globalization with the 
emergence of new spatial relations that are more disembedded and abstract presumes 
that place and territory, by contrast, is given in advance and then ‘acted upon’ by 
abstract forces associated with globalization. Scholte provides an example of this 
scalar logic in defining global relations as ‘social connections in which territorial 
location, territorial distance and territorial borders do not have a determining 
influence’ (Scholte, 2000: 179). Not surprisingly, the implication of such argument is 
to look to place, locality and nation – that which is territorially fixed – as a site of 
resistance to deterritorialisation. For example, Lloyd (2000) argues that faced with 
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‘this sense of destruction of local differences, and therefore of local identity … it is 
nationalism that is the only force that is capable of withstanding, even defeating 
globalization’ (Lloyd, 2000: 266-267). Aside from anthroporphising globalization, so 
that it moves from being a descriptor for a complex range of social processes to 
becoming an entity in its own right, this approach has the consequence of identifying 
some political struggles around globalization as being more ‘authentic’ than others 
e.g. those of local residents over ethnic minorities or migrant workers, or the defence 
of national culture over the media of diasporic communities. Amin describes this as: 
 
A peculiar politics of place in which relations within localities are cast as good 
and meaningful, and contrasted to bad and totalizing external relations. Its 
peculiarity follows from the ontological separation of place (read as in here, and 
intimate) and space (read as out there, and intrusive) as distinctive scalar realms 
(Amin, 2001: 6273).  
 
What is lacking here is a sense that, as the local and the global become 
interconnected, the nature of place is itself transformed, and the ‘spatial ontology of 
social organization’ comes to incorporate a multiplicity of interscalar relations (Amin, 
2002: 386). An example that Amin gives is that of contemporary London. London 
possesses populations whose activities primarily sit within global circuits of 
accumulation (e.g. financiers in the City of London) as well as those who have a more 
localized and grounded relationship to the city and to particular regions, but its highly 
multicultural population means that many people are engaged in various forms of 
diasporic brokering (import-export trade, provision of cultural services etc.) that 
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operate on a scale beyond the national, but are not activities being undertaken by a 
global cosmopolitan elite.  
 
6. Globalization leads to a ‘race to the bottom’, where globally mobile capital 
can ‘play off workers, communities and nations against one another’ (Crotty 
et. al., 1998: 118).  
 
One of the paradoxes of globalization debates is that, while the discussion is 
overwhelmingly about whether foreign investment benefits or disadvantages 
developing countries, the bulk of foreign direct investment (FDI) is in developed 
economies. Figure 1 (below) indicates that in 2006, over 60% of foreign direct 
investment was in developed economies, with the United States being the largest FDI 
recipient, and the United Kingdom second.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Whereas traditional theories of foreign investment have focused upon the relationship 
between ownership factors (the advantages that multinational corporations have in 
terms of access to finance, brand equity etc.), and location factors (availability of raw 
materials, lower-wage labour, host government incentives etc.), recent work on the 
multinational corporation has drawn attention to internalisation factors or the ability 
to capture localized sources of knowledge and apply them across multiple markets 
(Dunning, 2001a, 2001b). This is consistent with a shift in corporate global strategies 
from focusing primarily upon deriving greater profits from existing assets, by 
reducing costs through offshore production or selling into new markets, to strategies 
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that focus upon ‘the creation, as well as the use, of resources and capabilities … [and] 
organize activities in order to create future assets’ (Dunning, 2001a: 100). 
 
Storper (1997) argues that the ‘off-shoring’ of work to low-wage economies, runaway 
production and a more polarized new international division of labour is only one 
possible scenario arising from economic globalization. This deterritorialized 
economic development exists alongside  what he refers to as territorialized economic 
development, or ‘economic activity that is dependent on territorially specific 
resources’ (Storper 1997: 170). Territorialized production is that where product and 
services are not standardized, quality is prioritized by consumers and not only price, 
and production processes rely upon both specialist labour inputs and untraded 
interdependencies, or ‘conventions, informal rules, and habits that coordinate 
economic actors under conditions of uncertainty … [and] constitute region-specific 
assets’ (Storper 1997: 4-5).  
 
Storper observes that there is also a need to recognize globalization that results from 
the ‘local, path-dependent, and highly embedded technological change’ that has 
emerged in particular dynamic cities and regions, that ‘is a strong and positive driver 
of globalization, … because it supplies scarce resources to the global economy in the 
form of temporarily unique knowledge embedded in products or services’ (Storper, 
2000, p. 49). In contrast to the belief that globalization of trade, communications and 
access to technologies would lead to product standardisation, what is instead 
occurring is rather a dualistic development of technology, geographies, organization 
and innovation, with an increased premium placed upon that which is specialised and 
non-standardised: 
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It now appears that development … depends, at least in part, on 
destandardization and the generation of variety. The increasing spatial 
integration of markets for standardized products bids away monopolistic rents, 
while automation takes away employment, and advantage accrues to low-wage, 
low-cost areas. The only way out of this dilemma is to recreate imperfect 
competition through destandardization, the source of scarcity (Storper, 1997: 
32-33). 
 
 
Rethinking Media Globalization 
 
One feature of the literature on media globalization is the pervasiveness of the view 
that global media are dominated by a relatively small number of transnational 
corporations. At the same time, research on national and regional media systems 
continues to attest to the continued centrality of national media corporations in these 
media ecologies. There is an extensive history of research on Latin American media 
(e.g. Waisbord, 2000; Struabhaar, 2001; Sinclair, 2004, 2005) that points to the 
continued dynamism and centrality of Televisa (Mexico), Globo (Brazil) and Clarin 
(Argentina) in an age of satellite competition from FOX and CNN. Work on Asian 
media similarly indicates the struggle to develop pan-Asian services that can be 
competitive in different national markets even after over 20 years of widespread 
satellite and cable service availability (Thomas, 2005), and while the Middle East has 
seen regional satellite services achieve dominance over national broadcasters, it has 
very conspicuously been pan-Arab services such as Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya rather 
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than Western media that have been in the ascendancy (Dajani, 2005; Zayani, 2005). 
The of course there is China, where the world’s fastest growth in television ownership 
has not dislodged the hegemony of the state-run CTV services despite the availability 
of alternatives, and where the scope for Western media giants to expand operations 
has remained highly circumscribed and contingent on state policy (Zhao and Guo, 
2005: Wang, 2008).  
 
Paradoxically, then, one of the obstacles to the call to internationalize media studies 
(see e.g. Curran and Park, 2000; Couldry, 2007) is global media studies itself, or at 
least the version of it that has largely accepted without critical scrutiny the assumption 
of a scalar shift from discrete national media systems to a global mediascape 
dominated by a small number of transnational corporate behemoths. There is work 
that questions media globalization (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Hafez, 2007), and one 
of the most intriguing recent contributions has come from Jeremy Tunstall, in his 
book The Media Were American: U.S. Mass Media in Decline (Tunstall, 2007). 
Tunstall argues that 85 per cent of total world audience time is devoted to 
domestically produced media, and only 15 per cent to imported media, and that the 
share of national media has, contra globalization theory, been increasing since the 
1960s as more nations develop media production capacities and governments invest in 
media as an expression of national culture (Tunstall, 2007: 321).  
 
The point to be made here is not a simple inversion of the claim that there has been a 
scalar shift with globalization from the national to the global by reasserting the 
continued significance of national media space. It remains the case, as Couldry has 
argued, that ‘media always involve a rescaling of territory’ (Couldry, 2007: 248), and 
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that there is a need for an understanding of media cultures that is “translocal”, and 
recognises media as being multi-scalar. The point is rather that is it not a simple linear 
move from the local to the national to the global, but instead there is a complex web 
of scalar relationships that link to complex cultural and economic geographies of 
place. In order to best understand this, we need to conceive of globalization in 
relational rather than scalar terms. The remainder of this paper seeks to open up such 
thinking around the questions of: 
 
1. Whether the world’s largest media corporations can be considered to be global 
corporations; 
2. Whether the globalization of film and television production is primarily a cost-
driven process of ‘runaway production’; 
3. The scope for new media capitals to emerge that challenge the hegemony of 
‘Global Hollywood’. 
 
How Global are Media Corporations? 
 
When talking about global media corporations, there is an important distinction to be 
made between media corporations operating on a truly global scale, and nationally 
based corporations with overseas operations. Forms of media globalization that 
revolve around the sale of media and creative products and services in many markets 
have existed at least since the expansionary strategies of the Hollywood majors into 
Europe and Latin America in the 1920s. They are not synonymous with the 
development of a geographically dispersed global assets base, arising from foreign 
direct investment, strategic partnerships, and mergers and acquisitions. They are more 
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akin to what Dicken refers to as ‘national corporations with international operations 
(i.e. foreign subsidiaries)’ (Dicken, 2003a: 225). 
 
On the basis of the UNCTAD Transnationality Index, the media industries are not 
particularly transnational. UNCTAD data for 2003 found that four media or media-
related corporations were in the top 100 non-financial TNCs in term of their degree of 
transnationality – Vivendi Universal (20), News Corporation (22), Thomson 
Corporation (65) and Bertelsmann (98).5 UNCTAD’s 2004 data saw Vivendi 
Universal and News Corporation disappear from this list. In the case of Vivendi, this 
reflected its declining corporate fortunes, and in the case of News Corporation this 
was because it had relocated its corporate head office from Australia to the United 
States (UNCTAD, 2006; Flew, 2007). By 2005, only Canada’s Thomson Corporation 
appeared as a media corporation in the top 100 non-financial corporations in terms of 
the TNI. The finding that media corporations are less global than other sectors is 
consistent with the observation of Glyn and Sutcliffe (1999) that non-financial service 
industries tend to be less globalized, and their products less globally traded, than those 
of the manufacturing sector. Insofar as convergent media and communications 
industries have been becoming more transnational in recent years, the major growth 
has been in telecommunications rather than the media and entertainment sectors.  
 
If we take the world’s four largest media corporations in 2004 – Time Warner, 
Disney, Viacom and News Corporation – only one of these (News Corporation) could 
be said to have approached the status of a global corporation. By contrast, companies 
such as Time Warner, Disney and Viacom have a small share of their overall asset 
base outside of North America. Indeed, Time Warner does not list its assets located 
 26 
outside of the United States in its Annual Report, since the overwhelming bulk of its 
international revenues are derived from the sale of US copyrighted products abroad, 
and therefore constitute intangible assets based upon the commercial value of product 
titles. If we analyse international activity in terms of revenues acquired outside of the 
home country, and if we approach News Corporation as a US company, we find that 
Time Warner, Disney and Viacom have a comparable pattern of operations, deriving 
20–25 per cent of their total operating revenues from outside of North America, with 
News Corporation being the significant outrider, deriving 44 per cent of its revenues 
from outside of the United States (Table 1). While there is some evidence of the 
growing importance of international activities to these corporations, it is the case that 
‘the activities of large media companies appear to be less globalized than is the world 
economy as a whole’ (Sparks, 2007: 144). Updating these figures to 2007 does not 
reveal significant shifts (Table 2).  
Table 1 
Transnationality of the world’s largest media corporations, 2005 
 Total assets 
($US bn) 
Foreign assets 
as % of total 
assets 
TNI Revenue 
earned in 
North 
America (%) 
Revenue 
earned outside 
North 
America (%) 
Time Warner 122 * * 79 21 
Disney 53 14 18.5 77.5 22.5 
News 
Corporation 
56 19 32 56 44 
Viacom 15 5 10 78 22 
 
Source: Flew, 2007: 87.  
Table 2 
  2005 2006 2007 
Time-Warner Foreign assets as % of total * * * 
 Revenues earned outside of North 
America as % of total  
21 20 18 
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News Corporation Foreign assets as % of total 19 19.5 24 
 Revenues earned outside of North 
America as % of total 
46 44.5 47 
Disney Foreign assets as % of total 14 13 14.5 
 Revenues earned outside of North 
America as % of total 
22.5 24.5 23 
 
 
For a fuller understanding of the possibilities and pitfalls of large media corporations 
becoming more global in their orientation, as distinct from being national companies 
with international operations, it is Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation that is the 
exemplar. We lack a comprehensive analysis of News Corporation that is comparable 
to Wasko’s (2001) study of Disney, and much of the available literature is focused 
upon Rupert Murdoch as a distinctive media mogul more than on News Corporation 
as a global business (see e.g. Shawcross, 1992; Chenoweth, 2002; Rohm, 2003). An 
Australian company until the relocation of its head office from Adelaide to Delaware 
in 2004, it is a genuinely multinational media conglomerate, with investments across 
all media platforms over five continents. A detailed assessment of News 
Corporation’s global strategies is beyond the scope of this paper (see Flew, 2007: 88-
90 for an overview of key historical developments), but it would reveal some notable 
successes (such as the expansion of British newspaper interests in the 1970s and 
establishment of the FOX Television Network in the U.S. in the 1980s), some notable 
failures (the attempt to establish STAR TV as a pan-Asian satellite television service 
in the early 1990s, and the attempt to use the takeover of DirecTV in the U.S. in the 
2000s as the basis for a Sky Global Network of satellite TV services), and ventures 
where the outcome remain uncertain, most notably the ventures into mainland China 
through the Phoenix satellite television channel (Curtin, 2005; Thomas, 2006; Dover, 
2007). Such work should consider the extent to which News Corporation has relied 
upon local partners in its international expansion ventures, along the lines of ‘alliance 
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capitalism’ discussed by Dunning (2001a), and its sensitivities to content variation 
across its multiple services in different countries and continents. It was a News Corp 
executive who observed in 1995, after STAR TV was forced to move from being a 
pan-Asian English language service to a multi-local service that ‘There’s no money to 
be made in cultural imperialism’ (quoted in Sinclair, 1997: 144).  
 
Global Media Production: A ‘Runaway’ Model? 
 
There has been considerable debate about whether the growth in international film 
and television production form multiple locations represents the rise of new 
production centres that may compete with the dominant Hollywood cluster, or 
whether this is cost-driven ‘offshoring’ of production that simply consolidates the 
dominance of ‘Global Hollywood’. Miller et al. (2001) have proposed that the global 
media production system is structured around what they term the New International 
Division of Cultural Labour (NICL). For Miller et al., what is distinctive about the 
current phase of globalization of predominantly US-based audiovisual media 
industries is that they have been structurally separating the ‘activities of the hand’ – 
the production of films and television programmes as material artefacts – from the 
‘activities of the mind’, or the development of ideas, concepts, genres and programme 
forms. In a mode of thought that is derived from Adam Smith as well as Karl Marx, 
Miller et al. argue that production processes (‘activities of the hand’) are being 
progressively globalized in search of lower labour costs and other costs of production, 
while the generation and ownership of intellectual property (‘activities of the mind’) 
that involves the creation and exploitation of new product concepts remain highly 
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centralized. Evidence of this is seen, for example, in the global concentration of 
ownership of intellectual property such as copyright, patents, trademarks and designs.  
 
They argue that attempts by governments around the world to attract foreign 
investment in film and television production on the basis of tax incentives and lower 
labour costs simply replicate dependency relations across three tiers of global 
audiovisual production: (1) the U.S. as global centre, where knowledge, finance and 
decision-making remains concentrated; (2) a semi-peripheral or intermediate zone of 
(predominantly English-language) countries such as Canada, Britain, Australia and 
New Zealand, where production can be transferred to take advantage of costs relative 
to exchange rates; and (3) the rest of the world, which largely functions as either a 
scenic backdrop or as a source of cheap labour, and is completely dependent on the 
centre for one-off production. This capacity to redistribute work globally has the 
further consequence of ‘disciplining’ American cultural labour by demonstrating the 
capacity to shit work around the globe. Through the NICL, Miller et. al. argue, 
‘MNCs can discipline both labour and the state, such that the latter is reluctant to 
impoe new taxes, constraints or pro-worker policies in the face of possible declining 
investment (Miller et. al., 2001: 52).  
 
Global Hollywood has opened up an important new debate in global media studies, 
and a distinctive feature of the work of Miller et. al. is that they have moved beyond 
the question of media effects that has plagued previous work in the critical political 
economy tradition grounded in cultural imperialism, by shifting the focus from 
consumption and dominant ideologies to a focus on labour conditions and global 
production networks. It intersects with the concerns strongly expressed among 
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producer organizations and labour unions in the United States about the impact of 
runaway production on the U.S. film and television production industry. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce estimated the economic losses to the U.S. film and 
television industries from runaway production to be over $10 billion in 1998, up from 
$2 billion in 1990, and the Film and Television Action Committee and the Screen 
Actors’ Guild have been major lobbyists of policy-makers to resist industry plans to 
send production ‘offshore’ to countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  
 
The U.S. film and television industry claims about runaway production have ot gone 
uncontested. First, it is apparent that estimates on the extent to which it is occurring 
vary enormously, and are typically tied to particular interest groups. Estimates of the 
value of U.S.-developed productions produced outside of the U.S. in 1998 vary from 
$1.7 billion to $10.3 billion, with the lower figure coming from a Canadian-based 
consulting firm and the higher figure from a U.S.-based production firm acting on 
behalf of the Screen Actors Guild (McDonald, 2006: 32-33). Moreover, insofar as 
much of this production occurred in Canada, consultants acting on behalf of Canadian 
interests have argued that these figures needs to be considered alongside the $1.3 
billion deficit that Canada has in audiovisual trade with the U.S, as well as variations 
in the exchange rate between the U.S. and Canadian dollars, and the fact that 
Canadian production crews could hardly be considered to be exploited for their labour 
at the rates at which they are paid (McDonald, 2006: 33-34). Second, Goldsmith and 
O’Regan (2003) have questioned the use of the term ‘runaway production’, arguing 
that film production is increasingly internationalized and organized through global 
production networks, whereas the term ‘runaway production’ assumes that all aspects 
of a film or television production should occur in the one nation. Moreover, they 
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question the clear distinction drawn in these accounts between ‘economic’ and 
‘creative’ factors as determinants of production location decisions. They argue that 
such approaches imply a limited understanding of creativity, which downplays the 
relevance of the creativity and skills of those working in the emergent locations (see 
Figure 1 for factors influencing production location decisions). Third, a significant 
aspect of the critique of offshore production arises from American cultural 
nationalism, as illustrated by McDonald’s argument that: 
 
The movie industry is a national treasure that many Americans take for granted. 
Simultaneously, many in America would agree that movies, studios, and 
Hollywood (as a physical location and as a part of the American psyche) are 
treasures the nation should not export (McDonald, 2006: 81).  
 
Noting this is not to say that cultural nationalism is automatically wrong in principle. 
It is to note, however, that such arguments are now coming from the United States, 
when U.S. trade representatives and industry bodies such as the motion Pictures 
Association of America (MPAA) have long dismissed claims for a ‘cultural 
exception’ to bilateral and multilateral agreements to free up international trade as 
sentimental, backward-looking and denying the free expressions of poplar preference 
exhibited through commercial markets (Grant and Wood, 2004).  
 
In order to consider this question in more depth, two insights from geographical 
research are important. The first is to recognize, as noted earlier, that cost-driven 
globalization is only one aspect of international expansion, and that the NICL concept 
draws upon a model of foreign direct investment whose focus on cost reduction as the 
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primary driver has been challenged in more recent literature on multinational 
corporations (e.g. Storper, 1997; Dunning, 2001a, 2001b; Rugman and Verbeke, 
2001). This literature has drawn attention to the role played by both foreign direct 
investment and the formation of cross-border strategic alliances in corporate strategies 
for ‘the harnessing, creation, and organization of a range of knowledge-related assets 
from different locations as a competitive advantage in its own right’ (Dunning, 2001b: 
57). In the case of so-called ‘offshore’ or ‘runaway’ film and television production, 
such work would suggest that while cost factors may have been important first drivers 
of the relocation of film and television production out of the United States to other 
countries, the extent to which this is sustained over time will depend upon the extent 
to which sustainable locational clusters emerge in alternative production sites that 
make it worthwhile to continue to produce in such locations after short-term cost 
advantages have dissipated. There is considerable work to be done on whether 
patterns are emerging in media and entertainment industries that are comparable to 
other sectors where: 
 
Multinational enterprises are engaging in foreign direct investment specifically 
to tap into, and harness, country- and firm-specific resources, capabilities, and 
learning experiences … [and] may use their foreign affiliates or partners as 
vehicles for seeking out and monitoring new knowledge and learning 
experiences; and as a means of tapping into national innovatory or investment 
systems more conducive to their dynamic competitive advantages (Dunning, 
2001a: 20). 
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This focus on the internalization or knowledge-building advantages of multinational 
expansion has merged alongside the dramatic growth of global production networks. 
Discussion about ‘runaway’ production has largely focused upon the experience of 
the countries that capital investment has moved from, with considerably less 
consideration of impacts on the recipient nation. Ernst and Kim (2002) have argued 
that global production networks constituted the major organizational innovation in 
global corporate operations in the late 20th century, enabling new strategies for 
international knowledge diffusion across national boundaries, and creating new 
opportunities for knowledge capture and local capability formation in hitherto lower-
cost locations outside of the head office heartlands of North America, Western Europe 
and Japan. They argue that: 
 
A transition is underway from ‘multinational corporations’, with their focus on 
stand-alone overseas investment projects, to ‘global network flagships’ that 
integrate their dispersed supply, knowledge and customer bases into global (and 
regional) production networks (Ernst and Kim, 2002, p. 1418). 
 
For those countries that receive these new forms of foreign direct investment, the 
ability to capture new forms of knowledge-based value is vitally dependent upon the 
capacity of local suppliers integrated into these global production networks to meet 
the expectations of the global flagships, while at the same time continuously 
upgrading their absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity refers to the combination of 
the existing knowledge base and the intensity of commitment to acquiring new 
knowledge. Ernst and Kim use the concept of absorptive capacity to explain how 
Asian economies such as those of Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea moved up the 
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value chain from being relatively low-cost suppliers to Western MNCs in the 1970s 
and 1980s to having their own leading global firms and being relatively high-wage, 
knowledge-intensive economies with high levels of localized innovation (cf. Yusuf, 
2003). Similar thinking lies behind the strategy in China to develop ‘national 
champions’ in key economic sectors, whose capacity for innovation ‘piggy-backs’ off 
the knowledge acquired through partnerships with foreign investors (Nolan, 2004). 
 
Henderson et al. (2002, p. 445) have identified global production networks as 
providing a framework that is ‘capable of grasping the global, regional and local 
economic and social dimensions of … globalization’. They have noted a paradox in 
these production networks in that, while the networks themselves are not territorially 
defined, they work through social, political and institutional contexts that are 
territorially specific, principally – although not exclusively – at the level of the 
nation-state. This means that the actions of local firms, governments and other 
economic actors, such as trade unions, ‘potentially have significant implications for 
the economic and social outcomes of the networks in the locations they incorporate’ 
(Henderson et al., 2002, p. 446). Global production networks are thus partly 
deterritorialized in the sense used by Storper (1997), as they are not territorially 
‘bound’ in the manner of firms operating primarily at the level of the national 
economy. They are, nonetheless, spatially embedded in multiple respects, including  
interpersonal networks (for example, key decision-makers in the MNC need to 
interact with key decision-makers in the host nation, in which there will be pre-
existing social networks); being ‘anchored’ in particular national forms of governance 
(taxation systems, educational frameworks and so on); and institutional and cultural 
milieux, from which they can derive new forms of knowledge and draw upon 
 35 
distinctive well-springs of innovation. The circumstances under which host nations 
can enhance and capture value through FDI embedded in global production networks 
will depend upon factors such as: the nature and extent of technology and knowledge 
transfer; the sophistication and adaptive capacity of local suppliers; whether skill 
demands increase over time (enabling a move from low-wage, low-skill ‘generic’ 
labour to higher-skill, more specialist work); and whether local firms can begin to 
develop their own organizational, relational and brand ‘rents’, or unique profit-
generating attributes (Henderson et al., 2002, p. 449). In all of these areas, the roles 
played by national institutional influences, particularly those arising from government 
policy, are critical. 
 
New Media Capitals? 
 
While Miller et. al. have argued that trends towards internationalisation of media 
production involves the loss of both cultural sovereignty and control over intellectual 
property rights for host nations, economic geographers such as Scott (2004) has 
argued that ‘the steady opening up of global trade in cultural products is now making 
it possible for various audiovisual production centres around the world to establish 
durable competitive advantage and to attack new markets’ (Scott, 2004: 474). This 
raises the question of whether new media capitals may be emerging that present new 
competitive challenges to Hollywood hegemony. In his work on media capitals, 
Curtin has considered whether – as Tunstall has also argued – we may have already 
seen the peak of ‘Global Hollywood’, and the rise of alternative media production 
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centres in a manner akin to that which occurred with industrial production in the 
1970s: 
 
Just as Hollywood throughout its history absorbed elements and artists borrowed 
from afar, so too are other media capitals adapting the genres, visual 
conventions, technologies, and institutional practices of Hollywood to local 
conditions. Like Detroit in the 1960s, Hollywood today produces big bloated 
vehicles that command the fascination of audiences around the world. Yet at the 
same time it increasingly must take account of competitors who fashion 
products for more specific markets, using local labour, materials and 
perspectives. Such programs are not only cheaper to produce but also more 
attractive to target audiences because they are more culturally relevant (Curtin, 
2004: 292).  
 
Keane (2006) has provided an analogous means of conceiving of the relationship 
between global media and the emergence of new production centres in East Asia. 
Reflecting that the moment of ‘import-substitution’, or promotion and protection of 
local media production in order to redress the deleterious impact of global media and 
‘cultural imperialism’, has now mostly passed in East Asia, Keane identifies five 
means through which regional production centres can be integrated into the global 
media economy: 
 
1. World factory/outsourcing model, where the attractions of a particular 
production location are almost exclusively cost-driven (and, in the case of 
film, elements of the ‘look’ of an area), and where investment in the city or 
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region is largely based upon a fly-in/fly-out model, with no retention of 
intellectual property rights and no reinvestment into the local sectors; 
2. Isomorphism and cloning, where imitation of global media formats becomes 
the sincerest form of flattery, and where predominantly U.S.-based media 
formats are either directly copied without attribution of intellectual property 
rights, or local variants are developed with limited alteration; 
3. Cultural technology transfer, whereby the interaction between international 
investors and local capital, skills and talent enables the development of joint 
ventures which provide a springboard to local industry development through 
technology and – perhaps more importantly – knowledge transfer, through 
successful adaptation and ‘modelling’ (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2002) ; 
4. Niche markets and global hits, whereby the correlation between globalization 
and ‘localization’ is successfully exploited, so that media producers can 
benefit from a mix of regional sub-markets, identity-based sub-markets, an 
appeal to geographically dispersed diasporic communities, and niche markets 
within major global centres, as seen with the regional and global flows of 
music from some African countries (UNCTAD, 2008); 
5. Cultural/industrial milieux or creative clusters, where ‘the value of 
agglomeration is competitive advantage’ (Keane, 2006, p. xxx), arising from 
an interconnection of local creativity, international finance, a growing talent 
base attracted by the success of the city or region, supportive local industries 
and educational and training institutions, and links to related service 
industries, such as advertising and financial services. Such ‘creative clusters’ 
or ‘media capitals’ will typically service international rather than purely local 
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or national markets, as they become a hub for media flows across geographical 
boundaries (Curtin, 2003).  
 
In drawing together these competing propositions, we can observe that more media 
production is being out-sourced, reflecting the combination of ‘push’ factors such as 
rising costs in global production centres such as Hollywood, and ‘pull’ factors such as 
competition among a range of international media production centres for foreign 
investment, often leading to a variety of subsidies being offered to would-be foreign 
producers. In those approaches that see offshore media production as simply 
maintaining relations of dominance between the centre and the periphery, these 
international studios lack the ‘stickiness’ to keep mobile international capital there 
after the low-cost productions have occurred; as a result, little or no knowledge 
transfer occurs. By contrast, Christopherson (2002) has argued that the emergence of 
such ‘routine production locations’ marks the early stages of development of global 
production networks in film and television production, where such relation are less 
likely to be one-off and more likely to be ongoing.  
 
I would argue that because globalizing trends in media production require a 
recognition that ‘media always involve a rescaling of territory’ (Couldry, 2007: 248), 
globalization as metaphor retains some conceptual utility as it allows for an 
understanding of multi-scalar tendencies in both media production and consumption. 
At the same time, empirical work into such developments is not helped by the 
assumptions surrounding globalization as a scalar shift associated with arguments that 
a global space of flows has displaced national media cultures and that ‘placeless’ 
multinational capital has undermined the sovereignty of nation-states and the 
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relationship of territory to culture and economic organization. A more relational 
conception of intersections between the local, the national and the global is required 
to understand not only trends in media consumption and media culture, but also those 
of media production and the expansionary strategies of large media corporations, and 
it has been argued in this paper that cultural and economic geography offer important 
conceptual resources for such ongoing research work.  
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1 The terms transnational corporation (TNC) and multinational corporation (MNC) 
are used interchangeably in much of the literature. This paper will follow Dicken 
(2003), who defines the TNC as ‘a firm that has the power to coordinate and control 
operations in more than one country, even if it does not own them’ (Dicken, 2003: 
198). This definition is open enough to allow for a variety of ownership and control 
types, and does not presume that TNCs are in some sense “stateless’, as some work 
that distinguishes between MNCs and TNCs does.  
2 The distinction between the international and the global draws upon the observation 
of Rugman (2000) that most foreign direct investment is concentrated in particular 
geo-regional zones where there is a history of exchange and interaction e.g. the 
European Union, the East Asian and North Asian regional zones, and the NAFTA 
region on North America. There is a need for caution in equating overseas expansion 
with globalization, as the entry of a US-based corporation into Canada, or a German 
corporation into Britain, does not indicate their repositioning as a fully-fledged 
transnational corporation.  
3 The UNCTAD TNI focuses upon non-financial corporations because the assets of 
financial corporations are typically so liquid, and shifting so frequently between 
geographical locations, that it can be difficult to track the percentage of total assets 
held in one nation.  
4 The influence of this line of thinking is particularly strong in Castells’ analysis of 
global media e.g. ‘Cultures are made up of communication processes. And all forms 
of communication, as Roland Barthes and Jean Baudrillard taught us many years ago, 
are based on the production and consumption of signs. Thus there is no separation 
between “reality” and symbolic representation’ (Castells, 1996: 372).  
5 The UNCTAD Transnationality Index (TNI) measures the percentage of a 
company’s assets, sales and employees that are outside of that company’s national 
home base, and divides this figure by three.  
